From James Hasik, Atlantic Council: “Otherwise, doing better means tackling the inefficient and downright straightjacketing rules of the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) of 1980: the single entry point, the lockstep up-or-out promotion plans, and quite short careers before pensions. Want to rehire a fighter pilot who has been flying for the airlines? Or hire a senior maintenance engineer, at a market rate of pay commensurate with his experience? With DOPMA, those seemingly sensible moves are remarkably hard to execute. What’s wrong with the act has been discussed since not long after its passage. After years of talk, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter and his people actually worked on the problem for many months, but ultimately pulled back from requesting big changes. To begin with, not everyone was happy, and opposition came from some predictable quarters. Senator (and retired naval captain) John McCain of Arizona assailed many of the ideas as “an outrageous waste of time.” Why work so hard to keep some people in, he asked, when you’re forcing others out? The outrage at the hearings last February cost a would-be under secretary for personnel and readiness his job.”
From Sebastian Bae, Foreign Policy: "At any mention of personnel reform, most defense wonks and service members will either jump on their soapboxes for a sermon or run for the hills as fast as their legs will carry them. Both reactions are completely understandable; reforming talent management within the colossal machinery of the military is no small order. The hyper-centralized and rigid nature of the Pentagon inherently resists change. So, unsurprisingly, recent attempts in changing how the military manages talent have all failed in spectacular fashion. And for this reason alone, anyone working in the defense sector should read Tim Kane’s Total Volunteer Force."