By Andrea Little Limbago, War on the Rocks: “In one year alone, 450 million social media posts — roughly one in six — were fabricated in China. This is part of one of the most impactful global information operations campaigns since the end of the Cold War, but it has largely gone unnoticed. ”
Members of Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi movement and loyalists of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh withdrew from the streets of the capital Sanaa on Sunday after unprecedented violence between the two previous allies. Saleh’s General People’s Congress had warned of strife in a statement on Sunday after clashes in the upscale Hadda district led to the death of the group’s deputy head of foreign relations, Col. Khaled al-Rida, and two Houthi rebels.
The incident sparked fear of igniting all-out war in the rebel-controlled capital amid mutual accusations of treason, backstabbing and corruption within the fragile alliance between Saleh and the Houthis. The two erstwhile allies are fighting the internationally recognized government of Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi and the Saudi-led Arab military coalition that supports it.
Even though the Chinese government has not publicly released a detailed Yemen strategy, Chinese policymakers have consistently emphasized the need to bring hostilities in Yemen to a swift conclusion. A ceasefire in Yemen would help expand China’s military power projection capacity in the Middle East, centered on its new naval base in Djibouti.
A cessation of hostilities in Yemen would also have significant economic benefits for China, as it would give Beijing access to Yemen’s Bab al-Mandeb Strait, which links the Horn of Africa to the Middle East. Gaining access to this critical chokepoint will facilitate China’s objective of expanding the One Belt, One Road to Saudi Arabia, and allow China to actively participate in the trade of seaborne oil across Yemen’s maritime straits.
These strategic interests ensure that China’s principal goal in Yemen is preserving long-term political stability. Therefore, Beijing’s strategy in Yemen has consisted of backing the political faction that is most likely to reunite and stabilize the country. In the early stages of the conflict, Chinese officials viewed Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) allies as unilateral aggressors, which were destabilizing Yemen and preventing the Houthis from consolidating power. This interpretation of the Yemen conflict caused China to convince one of its leading international allies, Pakistan, to refrain from participation in the GCC military intervention in Yemen.
China’s strategic calculus began to change in late 2015, as the Houthis’ territorial expansion stagnated, and Hadi recaptured control over Aden. The Houthis’ loss of momentum and heightened international isolation caused Chinese policymakers to question the Houthis’ ability to guarantee Yemen’s long-term stability. These doubts were strong enough to convince Chinese policymakers to pivot towards Hadi’s pro-Saudi coalition. China’s shifting alignment was confirmed in January 2016, when Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Saudi Arabia and announced his support for Hadi’s “internationally recognized government” in southern Yemen.
· http://thediplomat.com/2017/08/chinas-role-in-the-yemen-crisis/
· http://thediplomat.com/2017/08/the-china-wildcard-in-the-qatar-crisis/