“During my most recent research trip to eastern Yemen late last year, I was struck by a meeting I had with three leading community members from Mukalla, which had been overrun by AQAP since April 2015. Long into the night I listened to their litany of complaints against AQAP, linked to the new restrictions afflicting their familiar daily routines. When I suggested continuing our discussion the next day, one of them was quick to apologize; he had to rush to a meeting with AQAP commanders. He shrugged off this seeming contradiction by explaining that there was a water problem in his village, and AQAP had promised to fix it. His companion chipped in with news of a long-standing land dispute that AQAP was helping to settle. Despite popular dislike of the organization, even its detractors grudgingly acknowledged that AQAP was approachable, had some sense of justice and got things done. In the West, counterterrorism is framed in terms of security: how to combat (read ‘kill’) militant jihadist fighters. But the real problem is not so much the jihadists, ready and even eager to die for their cause. It is AQAP’s notable ability to create safe havens in which extremism can flourish by establishing relationships among populations that rarely share their vision but nevertheless tolerate them. These populations abide AQAP because the terror group helps to support those communities.”
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula began withdrawing its forces from the cities of Jaar and Zinjibar yesterday as part of an agreement mediated by local tribal groups. Some fighters were seen abandoning their weapons outside of the cities, which have been occupied since last year and were previously captured by the group in 2011-2012. AQAP also withdrew from the port city of Mukalla last month and has come under increasing pressure from a military coalition of local forces and Gulf states, particularly the United Arab Emirates, intervening in the country. The U.S. Defense Department confirmed yesterday that it is providing support to counterterrorism operations in Yemen, including intelligence, naval support, and advising from Special Operations Forces at a command center.
Frank Wisner writes: Our nation’s interests lie in supporting Saudi leaders as they pursue this course, not looking for opportunities to embarrass them. This may be a tall order in the hyperventilating political season in which we find ourselves, but it is essential that our elected leaders—and those who aspire to become our leaders—resist the temptation to score short-term political points at the expense of our long-term global interests. – The National Interest